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Abstract
Extending the Myers and Majluf (1984) framework, we present a model for the choice of
seasoned-equity selling mechanism. A sequential pooling equilibrium exists which implies a
positive market reaction to certain flotation strategies. We examine the model implications
using the market reaction to issues on the Oslo Stock Exchange using the full range of flotation
methods. The average market reaction is non-negative across all methods, and significantly pos-
itive for both rights offerings and private placements, as predicted. We also show that average
long-run abnormal stock returns to OSE issuers are indistinguishable from zero, supporting the
market rationality assumption underpinning the flotation game.
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1 Introduction
Myers and Majluf (1984) provide the first analytical approach to the equity issue decision. A
key prediction of their adverse selection, separating equilibrium is that the market reaction to a
decision to issue securities will be negative and increasing in the risk that the issue is overpriced.
To date, this argument is the leading theoretical explanation for the joint finding of US empirical
studies that the market reaction to security offerings is negative for seasoned equity (SEOs), zero
for investment-grade straight debt issues, with convertible debt in between.1 Moreover, Eckbo and
Masulis (1992) argue that the possibility of current shareholder takeup of the equity issue implies
different market reaction to rights and underwritten offerings in a Myers-Majluf setting, and present
supporting evidence. Myers (1984) also suggests that costs of adverse selection drives a pecking
order of financial instruments, with a preference for internal over external financing and for debt
over external equity.2
However, the basic adverse selection model fails to explain the growing evidence of a positive
market reaction to equity issuances around the world (Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2005)). We
present both a theoretical and an empirical analysis of this puzzle. At the outset, an important
limitation of the original Myers-Majluf framework is their assumption that firms sell equity directly
to the market with no intermediary or system for communication. This in of itself exacerbates costs
of adverse selection. Preserving key aspects of the Myers-Majluf setup, we generalize the equity issue
decision by studying the economic tradeoffs between several commonly observed selling mechanisms.
These mechanisms, which include rights offer, underwriting and private placement, differ in terms
of direct costs as well as in their potential for creating wealth transfers. In effect, we present a
theoretical pecking order—not of financing instruments but of selling mechanisms. We use the
model implications to interpret the average market reaction to the complete set of flotation method
choices observed by issuers on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), which makes our empirical analysis
unique as well.
Our model preserves the assumption of Myers and Majluf (1984) that managers’ objective is
to maximize the value of current shareholders’ stake in the firm. This drives the potential for sep-
1See Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986) for equity offerings, Dann and Mikkelson (1984)
and Eckbo (1986)) for debt offerings. The evidence of insignificant market reaction to low-risk straight debt issues
fails to support asymmetric-information signaling models, e.g., such as Ross (1977).
2Frank and Goyal (2005) review the evidence on the pecking order theory of capital structure.
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arating equilibria where some high-value firms prefer to forego the investment project rather than
issuing undervalued stock. Dybvig and Zender (1991) argue that an appropriately structured man-
agerial compensation contract would eliminate this underinvestment problem. The result would
be a pooling equilibrium with a neutral market reaction to equity issues. The overwhelming em-
pirical evidence of a non-neutral market reaction to SEOs (also in our sample below) suggests to
us that managerial contracts do not resolve the underinvestment problem in this context. One
could also, as Cooney and Kalay (1993) and Wu and Wang (2004), allow for the possibility of
managerial overinvestment in order to generate equilibria with a positive market reaction to equity
issues. However, this begs the issue of why managers would issue equity to finance value-decreasing
projects on a regular basis. Hence our maintained assumption of equity-value maximization.
In our model, issuers have access to a menu of flotation methods. As in Eckbo and Masulis
(1992), we allow current shareholder participation in the issue through a rights offer, with or
without standby underwriting.3 Moreover, we include a flotation method where the issue proceeds
are fully guaranteed. Throughout the paper, we refer to this method as ’private placement’, but it
could equally well have been labelled ’firm commitment underwriting’ or ’bought deal’ by trivially
changing the direct cost structure. We prefer the private placement label because this is the only
fully guaranteed method observed on the OSE, our empirical laboratory.
A interesting feature of the model is that standby underwriters and private placement investors
have access to an informative inspection technology, and decide to accept or reject the issue request
following a round of ’bargaining’. The quality inspection is noisy and may lead to rejection of
the high-quality issuer. If rejected, the firm either abandons the issue (foregoing the investment
project) or tries the next available flotation method subgame. In the model, these choices are
derived endogenously. We identify a sequential equilibrium which implies a positive average market
reaction to certain equity issue strategies, also in the presence of adverse selection.
We focus primarily on pooling equilibria in the multistage issue game. In the extant literature,
various papers have examined separating equilibria in different settings. For example, Giammarino
and Lewis (1988) analyze sequential strategies in an extended Myers-Majluf setup, in a setting
with a single equity-selling mechanism. In their model, an uninformed ’financier’ may reject the
3In a standby rights offer, the underwriter performs due diligence, markets the issue, and guarantees the portion
of the issue not taken up by rights-holders. Thus, the difference between standbys and uninsured rights highlights
the marginal impact of the underwriter function.
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issue conditional on the offer price proposed by the informed issuer, and they identify possible
semi-separating equilibria implying a positive market reaction to the issue. Heinkel and Schwartz
(1986) derive a separating equilibrium involving the choice between rights and underwriting, but
does not use a sequential framework. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) present a model of the
choice between a private placement and the going-public (IPO) decision, where outside investors
have access to a costly information technology, but also do not consider sequential issue strategies.
Below, we comment on the possibility of separating equilibria in our multistage issue game as well.
We use the equilibrium analysis to interpret the relative market reaction to the observed flotation
strategies on the OSE, 1980–1996. The market reaction is non-negative for all categories, and
significantly positive for both uninsured rights offers and private placements. We also consider
alternative hypotheses for this evidence. For example, Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993)
and Cronquist and Nilsson (2003) hypothesize that a private placement may lead to a change in
shareholder monitoring of management. If managers enjoy private benefits of control, they may
have an incentive to place the issue with the public at large, as opposed to selling it as a single block
to a private investor that may actively monitor management performance. Or, management may
attempt to place the issue with a ”friendly” private investor that will not threaten its consumption
of control benefits. Either way, this control argument provides a separate motivation for the
flotation method choice and involves different predictions for the market reaction to the issue
announcement. Our empirical analysis, however, fails to support this alternative interpretation of
the market reaction to our seasoned equity-offering announcements.
Since our empirical inferences are based largely on the announcement-effect of equity offerings,
the presumption is that this market reaction is unbiased. An alternative hypothesis is that investors
misread the information in the public announcement or, as in the ”overconfidence” model of Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), place too much weight on their own private information.
The preponderance of the US-based evidence fails to reject the null of zero post-issue abnormal
performance (Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000), Eckbo and Norli (2004)). However, some studies
report negative long-run stock price performance following certain offer categories, e.g. Hertzel,
Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) for private placements. Due to the paucity of information about
the OSE, we include a long-run performance study for this market as well. This analysis requires
development of an empirical asset pricing model for the OSE. Using this empirical pricing model,
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we show that average three-year abnormal returns to a ”hedge” portfolio that is short in our issuers
and long in non-issuing matched firms fail to produce significant abnormal performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our theoretical framework predicting
the flotation method choice. Section 3 presents descriptive characteristics of the sample of equity
offerings and provides estimates of the announcement-period abnormal returns for private and
public equity offerings. Section 4 provides long-run abnormal return estimates, while Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Equilibrium flotation methods
This section examines equilibrium strategies in our multistage flotation method game. The setup
in terms of managerial objectives and the nature of the information asymmetry is as in Myers and
Majluf (1984). However, we generalize their analysis by allowing for sequential choices between a
set of costly flotation methods: uninsured rights (ur), rights with standby underwriting (sr), and
private placement (pp). The latter two involve informative but imperfect issue quality inspection.
As expected for a multistage game, the number of potential equilibria is large, and we focus pri-
marily on pure-strategy pooling equilibria. Towards the end, we outline how separating equilibria
may arise in our flotation game as well.
2.1 The issue decision criterion
The firm faces a short-lived investment project that must be financed externally. The investment
project has a net present value of b > 0 and an investment amount I, both of which are common
knowledge. The investment must be financed entirely by selling equity—using financial slack or
debt financing is not an option. Let a denote the value of assets in place. The firm knows its
true value a ∈ A, while outside investors only know the probability distribution with density p(a).
Current shareholders subscribe to a fraction k ∈ [0, 1] of the issue. We assume throughout that the
issue announcement reveals k to the market.4 Managers’ objective is to maximize the value of old
4In practice, investors learn k from three sources: (i) the offering prospectus announcing shareholder subscription
pre-commitments, (ii) the trading activity in the second-hand market for rights, and (iii) the general characteristics
of the firm’s share ownership structure (small shareholders are less likely than large shareholders to participate in
the offering). Regulatory requirements limit k in private placements (placing an upper bound on the number of
shareholders for the issue to qualify), which we account for in the analysis below.
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(pre-issue) shareholders equity stake in the firm.
Let d denote direct issue costs (underwriter fees, legal fees, mailing costs etc.), and δ ≡ n/S
the ratio of new shares issued (n) to the post-issue number of shares (S). Then, δ(1 − k) is the
fraction of the post-issue company held by new shareholders, and the condition for issuing equity
can be written as:
[1− δ(1− k))] (a+ b+ I − d) ≥ a+ kI. (1)
The left-hand side of equation (1) is the value of old shareholders claim on the post-issue firm, given
that they take up a portion k of the new issue. The right-hand side is the value of old shareholders
claim on the firm if it does not issue plus the funds old shareholders would have contributed to
the equity issue. Note that equation (1) reduces to the issue criterion in Myers and Majluf (1984)
when k = 0 (current shareholders remain passive) and d = 0 (zero flotation costs).
The issue condition (1) depends on the market price P of the issue.5 To see how, let S = 1
(without loss of generality). Since the issue proceeds I have to satisfy I = Pn, we can write
δ = I/P . By substitution, the payoff pi to old shareholders from issuing is:
pi(a, d, k, P ) = b− d− I(1− k) [(a+ b+ I − d)− P ]
P
, (2)
and the issue decision criterion is pi(a, d, k, P ) ≥ 0. This issue condition says that the project NPV
must exceed direct issue costs and a (potential) wealth transfer between old and new shareholders.
The wealth transfer depends on the market price P , which in turn is determined by investors’
equilibrium beliefs about a. The equilibrium beliefs determines whether P differs from the full-
information value of the post-issue company, a+b+I−d. The difference is zero in a fully separating
equilibrium (as in Myers and Majluf (1984)) while it is positive in our pooling equilibrium (see
below). As first pointed out by Eckbo and Masulis (1992), regardless of the putative equilibrium,
the wealth transfer is attenuated by current shareholder participation in the issue (k > 0).
In the analysis below, we focus primarily on pooling equilibria. In any pooling equilibrium,
the low-value type mimics the high-value issuer’s flotation strategy, so it suffices to look at the
participation constraint for the high-value firm. To simplify, partition the issuer-type space in two
5For rights offerings (standbys or uninsured), P is the sum of the subscription price set by the issuer and the total
market value of the number of rights necessary to acquire one new share.
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parts, ”high” and ”low”, or A = {a1, a2}, where a1 < a2. Let µ be the probability that investors
put on the high-value type in equilibrium. The post-issue value of all shares is then
P = (1− µ)(a1 + b+ I − d) + µ(a2 + b+ I − d), (3)
which, when substituted into equation (2) yields the value of the issue condition given investors’
beliefs.
To simplify the notation, we scale all exogenous variables in terms of the assets in place for the
high-value type a2, as follows:
Required project investment amount I ≡ αa2
Assets in place for low-value type a1 ≡ βa2
Direct issue costs, i ∈ {pp, sr, ur} di ≡ ρiI = ρiαa2
Project net present value b ≡ ηI = ηαa2
Shareholder takeup in private placement is scaled down to γk, γ ∈ [0, 1] (γ = 1 for standbys and
uninsured rights). Using the redefined variables, the issue condition for the high-value type can
now be written as:
pi(a2, di, γ, k, P ) = b− di − αa2(1− γk)(1− β)(1− µ)
β + (1− β)µ+ (1 + η − ρi)α ≥ 0. (4)
In sum, the high-value issuer type will choose a particular issue method i ∈ {pp, sr, ur} if the
payoff pi in equation (4) is positive (a participation constraint) and if the expected cost of method i
is less than the expected cost for any other issue method (an incentive constraint), given investors’
beliefs µ in equilibrium.
2.2 The multistage equity-flotation game
Figure 1 describes the stages in the issue game. In the first subgame, issuers selects from a menu that
includes all three flotation methods. as well as ”no issue” Before undertaking a private placement
or a standby offering, the issuer undergoes a quality inspection. If the offer is rejected following
inspection, the issuer either does not issue (and abandons the investment project) or moves on to
the second flotation method subgame in Figure 1. This subgame is identical to the first subgame,
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however, the subsequent options are fewer. We are assuming that there only exists a single private
placement investor (or group of investors). Therefore, rejection by the private investor in the first
subgame eliminates this flotation method in the second subgame. The third and last subgame is
reached only if the issuer is inspected and rejected twice. Thus, in the third subgame there are
only two remaining options; use uninsured rights or do not issue.
Let q denote the probability that quality inspection truly identifies the high-value type (a2).
The quality inspection is assumed to be informative (q > 0.5), symmetric, and identical for standby
underwriters and private placement investors.6 Following inspection, the issuer and the investor
bargain over the offer price (illustrated by the ovals in Figure 1). Negotiation means that the issuer
suggests a price and the investor/underwriter accepts or rejects. Negotiations succeed if and only
if the issuer’s lowest acceptable issue price (the reservation price) is below the reservation price of
the the private investor or the underwriter (their highest acceptable prices). The reservation price
of the issuer is determined by the expected price that she will get in the continuation game that
starts after a bargaining fails. A rejection is private information.
2.3 Pooling equilibria
The sequential equilibrium of Kreps and Wilson (1982) is used to characterize pure strategy equilib-
ria in our flotation game, where investors’ beliefs are formed using Bayes’ rule. As shown below, the
equilibrium flotation method path will depend on certain critical values of the shareholder takeup
k. These threshold values are derived from the issuer’s participation constraints and thus reflect
both the project’s net present value and total flotation costs.
For the pooling equilibrium analysis, we assume the following direct-cost structure: dsr >
dur and dsr > dpp. The direct costs of standby rights is assumed to exceed the direct cost of
uninsured rights because the former include standby fees.7 We also assume that the direct cost
of private placements are lower than the direct costs of standby rights. This reflects the fact that
6With only two issuer types, a random (uninformative) inspection implies that q (a2 | a2) = 0.5. With multiple
issuer types, informativeness means that q (a | a) > q (a | a′) > q (a | a′′) for a adjacent to a, and a not adjacent to
a′′. That is, the probability of concluding any particular type a decreases with the difference in value between a
and the type being inspected. The inspection is symmetric when q (a1 | a2) = q (a2 | a1). Given access to the same
inspection technology, the main difference between the private placement investor and the standby underwriter is the
comparative direct cost-advantage of the private placement investor (dpp < dsr), and the lower shareholder takeup
implied by a private placement.
7Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen (1997) document that the direct cost of standby rights on the OSE are about
twice as large as the direct costs of uninsured rights issues.
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the registration process for private placements is simpler (less costly) and does not require the
issuer to administer the rights subscriptions. Note that we do not make any assumptions regarding
the relative cost of uninsured rights vs. private placement. Finally, we assume that a rejected
issuer does not pay for the inspection. This assumption is relaxed below when we discuss possible
separating equilibria.
We start in Proposition 1 by showing that high-k firms go straight to uninsured rights in
equilibrium. As k increases, the wealth transfer between old and new shareholders decreases (it is
zero when k = 1, see Eq. 4). When the wealth transfer is low, the flotation method decision is
driven primarily by direct issue costs, which are lowest for uninsured rights.8 We then discuss the
equilibrium choices of low-k issuers (Proposition 2), medium-k issuers (Proposition 3) and, finally,
all issuers regardless of k (Proposition 4).
Proposition 1 (high-k issuers): It is part of a pooling sequential equilibrium for issuers with
high current shareholder takeup k, such that k ≥ max{k1b, k1pp, k1sr}, to follow the flotation
method path {ur}.
Proof We first derive the equilibrium beliefs of investors (the market, private placement investor,
underwriter) and then substitute these into the issuer participation constraints. This yields the
critical k-values {k1b, k1pp, k1sr} that determine the equilibrium strategy in the proposition.
(1) Beliefs: When approached by a firm that wants to issue equity using uninsured rights, the
market forms beliefs (posterior probability) µ that the issuer is of the high-value type. The approach
may be the issuer’s first move in the flotation game, denoted µ(ur), or it may happen after two
rounds of inspection and rejection, denoted µ(pp, sr, ur). Either way, the market assumes that the
equilibrium strategy is {ur}, so we have that
µ(ur) = µ(pp, sr, ur) = 1− p. (5)
8If private placement were the method with the lowest direct costs, some high-k issuers will still prefer uninsured
rights. The reason is that shareholder takeup in a private placement is small so the wealth transfer to new shareholders
may still be significant.
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All off-equilibrium flotation method paths involve issuer inspection. The beliefs of the private
placement investor or the underwriter that the issuer is of the high-value type, given that the
inspection concludes high type, is denoted ψ. The argument of ψ indicates whether the inspection
is the first (e.g. ψ(pp)) or the second attempt by the issuer (e.g. ψ(pp, sr)). We also need to
specify the beliefs about which issuer types will deviate from the equilibrium path. The simplest
is to assume that high- and low-value issuers are equally likely to deviate. Finally, let the private
placement investor and the underwriter know whether they are the first to be approached by the
issuer. It then follows that
ψ(pp) = ψ(sr) =
q(1− p)
(1− q)p+ q(1− p) (6)
for the first inspection, and
ψ(pp, sr) = ψ(sr, pp) = 1− p (7)
for the second inspection (the two inspection results cancel out).
(2) Participation constraints: Total issue costs are derived using Eq. (4) and the beliefs shown
above. To simplify the exposition, we use a superscript to indicate that beliefs are formed following
at most one inspection: µ′ ≡ µ(ur), ψ′ ≡ ψ(pp). Thus, absence of a superscript indicates that
more than one inspection has been undertaken, e.g. ψ ≡ ψ(pp, sr). Furthermore, let Ci denote the
total flotation cost when the flotation method path i involves two inspections ({pp, sr}, {sr, pp},
{pp, sr, ur}), and let C ′i denote the flotation cost when the path involves a single or no inspection
({ur}, {pp} and {sr}). Note that since the cost of rejection is zero for the issuer, Cur = C ′ur. The
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different issue costs are as follows:
C ′ur ≡ dur +
αa2(1− k)(1− β)(1− µ′)
β + (1− β)µ′ + (1 + η − ρur)α
Cpp ≡ dpp + αa2(1− β)(1− γk)(1− ψ)
β + (1− β)ψ + (1 + η − ρpp)α
C ′pp ≡ dpp +
αa2(1− β)(1− γk)(1− ψ′)
β + (1− β)ψ′ + (1 + η − ρpp)α
Csr ≡ dsr + αa2(1− k)(1− β)(1− ψ)
β + (1− β)ψ + (1 + η − ρsr)α
C ′sr ≡ dsr +
αa2(1− k)(1− β)(1− ψ′)
β + (1− β)ψ′ + (1 + η − ρsr)α
(8)
This gives the following set of incentive constraints for the first stage of the game:
C ′ur ≤ qC ′pp + (1− q) [qCsr + (1− q)C ′ur]
C ′ur ≤ qC ′sr + (1− q) [qCpp + (1− q)C ′ur]
C ′ur ≤ qC ′pp + (1− q)C ′ur
C ′ur ≤ qC ′sr + (1− q)C ′ur
C ′ur ≤ b
(9)
Since ψ′ < ψ, it follows that Cpp > C ′pp and, similarly, Csr > C ′sr. This means that the first and
second condition in Eq. (9) never binds, and the binding incentive constraints are:
C ′ur ≤ C ′pp
C ′ur ≤ C ′sr
C ′ur ≤ b
(10)
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Solving the inequalities for k gives the restrictions on shareholder takeup in the proposition:
k1pp =
dur − dpp
αa2(1− β) +
p
v′ur
− 1− ψ
′
v′pp
p
v′ur
− 1− ψ
′
v′ppγ
k1sr = 1− dsr − dur
αa2(1− β)
[
p
v′ur
− 1− ψ
′
v′sr
]
k1b = 1− (b− dur)v
′
ur
αa2(1− β)p
(11)
where
v′pp = β + (1− β)ψ′ + (1 + η − ρpp)α
v′sr = β + (1− β)ψ′ + (1 + η − ρsr)α
v′ur = β + (1− β)µ′ + (1 + η − ρpp)α
(12)
The interpretation of the condition k ≥ max{k1b, kpp, ksr} as stated in the proposition is as follows:
k ≥ k1b is required for the firm to issue equity, k ≥ k1pp is required for uninsured rights to be more
profitable than private placement, and k ≥ k1sr is necessary for uninsured rights to be preferable
to standby rights.
Figure 2 illustrates this equilibrium. The key parameters are the informativeness of the inspec-
tion technology, direct issue cost, and degree of shareholder takeup in private placement. Panel A
illustrates an equilibrium with q = 0.8,9 direct costs as a percentage of issue proceeds of ρur = 0.02,
ρpp = 0.02, and ρsr = 0.044, respectively, and a shareholder takeup in a private placement of 30%
of the takeup that would have materialized in a rights offering (γ = 0.3).10 In this example, the
binding condition is k ≥ ksr(dur, dsr, q) = 0.81. Thus, issuers with current shareholder takeup
greater than 0.81 optimally issue equity using uninsured rights.
Panel B of Figure 2 shows that the {ur} equilibrium exists even if the direct cost of uninsured
rights is assumed to be higher than the direct cost of private placement. The reason is that a
private placement is associated with larger wealth transfer cost than uninsured rights because
9Recall that q(ai | ai) = 0.5 if the inspection is completely uninformative.
10The remaining parameters are p = 0.5, a2 = 109, α = 0.275229, β = 0.541284, and η = 0.367.
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γk < k. Without this additional wealth transfer cost for private placement, the {ur} equilibrium
would not exist if ρpp < ρur. Panel C illustrates this by setting γ = 1.0, ρur = 0.03, ρpp = 0.02. In
the last Panel of Figure 2 we illustrate the effect of making the inspection function uninformative.
If private investors and underwriters have no competitive advantage relative to the market, the
issue decision would be determined completely by direct cost and shareholder takeup (as in Eckbo
and Masulis, 1992).
Figure 2 makes it clear that the {ur} equilibrium does not exist for firms with relatively low k.
We next turn to equilibria for issuers with shareholder takeup below the level that makes uninsured
rights optimal.
Proposition 2 (low-k issuers): It is part of a pooling sequential equilibrium that issuers with
current shareholder takeup k such that k ≤ min{k2pp, k2sr} and k ≥ k2b, follow the flotation
method path {pp, sr, ur}.
Proof The structure of the proof is analogous to the one for Proposition 2 and is therefore
relegated to the appendix.
Table 1 presents an example of an equilibrium that satisfies Proposition 2. Any issuer with low
current shareholder takeup first tries to float the new equity using a private placement. The tradeoff
is between the lower direct issue costs for private placements and the greater wealth transfer cost
given the lower effective takeup. However, when k is small, the first effect dominates the second.
In the example, if the private placement investor concludes type a2, both issuer types propose
an offer price of 139.40, which makes the private placement investor indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the equity issue. If the inspection by the private investor concludes type a1, the
highest offer price acceptable to the private investor is 99.10. However, the expected cost for the
high-value issuer of proceeding to standby rights (6.57) is lower than the costs incurred if placing
equity privately at this price (14.21). Therefore, the high-value issuer optimally proposes an offer
price that will be rejected by the private investor. In the subsequent standby rights sub-game, if
the underwriter concludes the inspection with type a2, both issuer types propose offer price 123.68,
which is accepted by the underwriter. This gives the high-value type issue costs of 4.96. If the
inspection conclusion is type a1, the high-value type would again optimally propose an offer price
that will be rejected by the underwriter. If the issuers are rejected twice, both types issue using
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uninsured rights at an offer price 102.34.
There also exists an equilibrium where the issuer approaches the underwriter before the private
investor:
Proposition 3 (intermediate-k issuers): It is part of a pooling sequential equilibrium that is-
suers with current shareholder takeup k such that k ≤ min{k3pp, k3sr} and k ≥ k3b, follow the
flotation method path {sr, pp, ur}.
Proof See appendix
Issuers that find it optimal to approach the underwriter first will typically have levels of share-
holder takeup that is greater than the level of takeup when private placements is the first choice.
Moreover, the level of takeup is lower than for issuers that find it optimal to go straight to uninsured
rights. However, there are levels of takeup that are part of two equilibria. That is, the conditions
on k from proposition 3 may overlap with the conditions from propositions 1 and 2. We propose the
following definition to choose between overlapping equilibria: A sequential equilibrium {x} Pareto
dominates a sequential equilibrium {y} if the expected costs in equilibrium {x} is lower than in
equilibrium {y}. We refer to {x} as a Pareto dominant equilibrium. Applying this criterion to the
equilibria in the previous propositions yields the following equilibrium strategies for the full range
of k ∈ [0, 1]:
Proposition 4 (all issuers) There exists levels of shareholder takeup k4pp and k4sr, k4pp < k4sr,
such that {pp, sr, ur,} is a Pareto dominant equilibrium for issuer with k < k4pp, {sr, pp, ur}
is a Pareto dominant equilibrium for issuer with k ∈ [k4pp, k4sr], and {ur} is a Pareto dominant
equilibrium for issuer with k > k4sr.
Proof See appendix.11
Figure 3 illustrates the existence of takeup levels k4pp and k4sr. Using the same parameter
values as in Table 1, issuers with current shareholder takeup less than k4pp = 0.51 attempt a
private placement as the first choice. Issuers with k between k4pp = 0.51 and k4sr = 0.62 attempt
11Note that for reasonable assumptions about direct costs, {pp, ur} and {sr, ur} are not equilibria. The reason is
that they are not subgame perfect. For example, if rejected by the private investor, and issuer will always prefer to
test the underwriter before going to the market to do ur.
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a standby rights offering as the first choice, and issuers with k greater than k4sr = 0.62 go directly
to uninsured rights offer.
2.4 Separating equilibria: Adverse selection and signaling
Up to this point we have focused strictly on pooling equilibria in the game between the issuer
and investors. There may also exist separating equilibria. For example, as in Myers and Majluf
(1984), the high-value issuer may find the wealth transfer too costly in equilibrium. If the issuer
participation constraint equation (4) is binding, the high-value firm prefers to forgo the project
over selling under-priced equity.12 In a separating equilibrium where the high-value type does not
issue, the market infers the true value of the issuer (low), and there is no wealth transfer. As a
result, issuers select the flotation method with the lowest direct cost: uninsured rights regardless
of the value of k.
A separating equilibrium may also arise where the high-value type signals its type. Giammarino
and Lewis (1988) and Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) develop models with this type of separating
equilibria. Giammarino and Lewis (1988) study the bargaining game between an issuer and a
financier-underwriter (a single available flotation method). As in the bargaining stage of our model,
the issuer suggests an offer price and the financier accepts or rejects. However, while we limit our
attention to pure strategy equilibria, their players randomize between pure strategies. That is, in
equilibrium, an issuer can suggest a “high” price with some probability θ and a “low” price with
probability 1− θ and the financier randomizes between accepting or rejecting the offer.
Giammarino and Lewis (1988) show the existence of a semi-pooling equilibrium:13 The high-
value type always makes a “high” price offer, while the financier randomizes between accepting and
rejecting the “high” offer price but always accepts a “low” offer price. When the low-value type is
relatively more eager to finance the project (the ratio of assets in place to post-issue value is higher
for the low-value type), the low-value type will find a way to avoid being rejected too often by the
financier. This is accomplished by randomizing between the “low” price (which is always accepted
12By inspection of equation (4), for a given investment amount (I), the participation constraint is more likely to
bind the lower the net present value of the project, and the greater the difference between the values of assets in
place of the high- and the low-value types. Increasing this difference (i.e., decreasing the parameter β) increases the
wealth transfer cost to the high-value type.
13In a semi-pooling equilibrium, one type makes the pooled offer with probability one while the other type ran-
domizes between the pooled offer and the separating offer.
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by the financier) and the “high” price. In this signaling equilibrium, it is the low-value type that
ends up being revealed in the separating part of the equilibrium. Giammarino and Lewis (1988)
also provide another semi-pooling equilibrium where the high-value type is relatively more eager to
obtain financing. This equilibrium does not exist in our setting since, when b is the same for both
types, the low-value type will always be the most eager to obtain financing.
Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) obtain a separating equilibrium by focusing on the cost of a failed
(uninsured) rights offer. If the offer price is set high (so that the rights are expected to trade
close to zero), the probability that the offer fails is large for a low-value type that tries to mimic
a high value type. Thus, the expected failure cost of setting a high offer price is larger for the
low-value type than for the high-value type, and the offer-price becomes a signaling mechanism for
the high-value type. High-value types signals their value by choosing rights offers (with high offer
prices) while low-value types conceal their value to investors by using a fully underwritten issue.14
Since our model ignores the failure probability in rights offers and since we limit our attention
to pure strategy equilibria, the signaling equilibria discussed above do not exist in our multistage
flotation game. However, what if there is a cost to the issuer of being rejected by the inspection?
In practice, underwriters and private placement investors do not charge the firm for inspections
that lead to rejection. However, rejection may slow the investment process as the firm must find
another way of issuing equity. Since inspection is informative, this outcome is more likely for
the low-value type than for the high-value type. However, in our model this is not sufficient for
a separating equilibrium: Suppose there existed an equilibrium where the high-value type could
signal its value by choosing to expose itself to inspection. In this equilibrium, the inspector would
have post-inspection beliefs that put a probability of one on the high value type—regardless of the
outcome of the inspection. But, then the low-value type could mimic the high-value type—breaking
the putative separating equilibrium.
2.5 Empirical predictions
In the empirical analysis below, we estimate the market reaction to seasoned equity offering an-
nouncements. The market reaction is AR ≡ (p+ − p−)/p−, where p+ and p− are the post- and
14Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) also show that in the pool of rights offers, the issuers with the highest value in
the pool separate from the rest by paying a fixed investigation cost. In contrast to our inspection technology, they
assume that the true type is fully revealed by paying the fixed cost.
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pre-announcement stock prices of the issuer, respectively. Our theory explains the equilibrium be-
liefs that are reflected in p+ as a function of k and the flotation method. In order to structure our
predictions for AR, we also need to make an auxiliary assumption concerning the information con-
tent of p−. Consistent with the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 4, we assume that investors prior
to the issue announcement believe the participation constraint (eq. (4)) is always satisfied for at
least one flotation method. We subsequently relax this assumption, allowing for prior expectations
of adverse selection.
Hypothesis 1 (Pooling equilibrium): Suppose issuers follow the flotation game of Figure 1,
and that the equity issue announcement reveals the value of k. Using the critical k-values defined
in Proposition 4, let ”high k” mean k ∈ [ksr, 1], ”medium k” mean k ∈ [kpp, ksr] and ”low k” mean
k ∈ [0, kpp]. The market reaction to the issue announcement, AR ≡ (p+ − p−)/p−, is as follows:
k high k medium k low
Uninsured rights: ARur = 0 ARur < 0 ARur < 0
Standby rights: no equilibrium ARsr > 0 ARsr = 0
Private placement: no equilibrium ARpp = 0 ARpp > 0
Hypothesis 1 follows directly from Proposition 4. All firms with high k prefer to issue using the
low-cost uninsured rights method. Since there is no inspection, there is no information conveyed
by the issue decision, thus ARur = 0. Issuers of uninsured rights with medium or low k have been
rejected twice by the quality inspection, thus ARur < 0. Medium-k issuers prefer standbys, creating
a positive market reaction (ARsr > 0) due to the positive inspection result. For low-k issuers,
ARsr = 0 since the issuer have been rejected by the private placement inspection before succeeding
with the standby inspection, with a neutral net information effect to the market. Medium-k issuers
that use private placement have first been rejected by the standby underwriter, thus ARpp = 0.
Finally, for low-k issuers, private placement is the first choice, so the successful inspection result
implies ARpp > 0.
However, suppose the market believes prior to the issue announcement that the participation
constraint in eq. (4) is binding for some high-value firms. This creates expectations of adverse
selection, and results in the pre-issue price p− reflecting an underinvestment discount. Moreover,
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high-k issuers will now be met with a positive market reaction (ARur > 0) because the issue
announcement prompts the market to increase p− by the expected value of the investment project
in the high-value state. This effect is easily illustrated by a numerical example. Suppose investors
know that the firm is in one of two equally likely states, as follows:
High state (p=0.5) Low state
Assets in place a1=150 a2=50
Project NPV b=20 b=20
If k = 0, the firm issues only in the low state, and we have that p− = (150×0.5+(50+20)×0.5) =
$110 and p+ = (50+20) = $70. If k = 1, the firm issues in both states and the issue announcement
does not reveal the true state. However, the announcement causes the market to capitalize the value
of the project in both states, so p+ = $120. Thus, in the adverse selection separating equilibrium
ARur=-36%, while in the pooling equilibrium, ARur=9%.
In the next section, we estimate the market reaction to seasoned equity offerings on the OSE.
By including the full range of flotation methods in the analysis, we are in a position to make full
use of Hypothesis 1 in interpreting the empirical estimates.
3 Market reaction to seasoned equity offerings
3.1 Sample characteristics
Our total sample of 381 public and private equity offerings by OSE-listed firms is collected from
annual reports published by the OSE, the OSE Daily Bulletin, and major business newspapers
such as Dagens Næringsliv and Aftenposten over the period 1/1980–12/1996. The 381 offerings
represents nearly the population of equity issues over the period, excluding only private placement
made as part of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).
If the equity issue is a payment to target shareholders in a takeover, using the rights offer
method is not an option. Moreover, these private placements directly signal the existence of the
investment project (the takeover) which by itself may cause unusual stock price movements. We
therefore single out private placements related to takeovers. Because data on the exact use of the
proceeds from private placements is limited, we treat a private placement as takeover-related if the
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issuer is involved in a merger or acquisition within one year of the SEO date. Data on mergers and
acquisitions is available from various OSE publications.
Table 2 lists the annual distribution of the 381 issues, of which 228 are public offerings using
rights, and 153 are private placements. Of the rights offerings, 80 cases use uninsured rights and
148 use the standby rights method. Of the private placements, 126 are unrelated to merger activity
while in 27 cases the equity issue is a means of paying target shareholders in a takeover. The
second column of Table 2 shows the number of issues as a percent of the number of firms listed
on the OSE. This percentage is typically between 10% and 20%—which is high compared to the
U.S. (Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000)). For example, on the NYSE
and Amex, the percentage of issuers relative to the total number of listed firms reaches 10% only
during the “hot” issue markets in the early 1980s.
Table 3 provides information on issue- and issuer-specific characteristics for the total sample.
The 228 public offerings involving rights are made by 116 different OSE-listed firms, while the 153
private placements are undertaken by 91 different firms, respectively. Thus, OSE-listed firms that
float new equity using rights offers do so on average twice over the 17-year sample period. For
private placements, the average sample firm issues 1.7 times over the sample period (60 firms issue
once only). The largest number of issues by a single company is 7 for the public offering sample
and 6 for the private placement sample. The equity issue size averages NOK 146 mill. for rights
and standbys, and NOK 120 mill. for private placements. Both the amount offered and market
value of the issuer are on average larger for standby offerings than for uninsured rights offerings.
Comparing standbys to private placements, the average equity market capitalization is similar.
Private placement issuers tend to have lower book-to-market ratio.
Panel (b) in Table 3 provide information on the ownership structure of the issuing firm. The
holdings of the ten largest shareholders confirm that Norwegian companies have a relatively concen-
trated ownership structure (ranging from 57% to 65% across issuer types). Note that, for standbys
and private placements, the issue itself does not materially change the ownership proportion of the
ten largest shareholders over the year of the issue. This implies that the group of the ten largest
shareholders typically either participates in the private placement directly, or purchases shares in
the market following the issue so as to maintain its ownership proportion. With the ownership
proportion of the group of largest shareholders unchanged, it is difficult to argue that the private
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placements change monitoring of management by this group. The table also shows that insiders
(the CEO and members of the board of directors) reduce their proportional shareownership from
18% to 15% over the year of the private placement. Whether this is sufficient to materially alter
agency costs remains an open question. We return to this issue below.
3.2 Current shareholder takeup
Table 4 describe current shareholder takeup (k) in the rights offering sample. Rights are traded
in an organized market and we use data on the rights trading activity to estimate k. Assuming
that each right is traded only once during the rights offer period, k can be estimated as one minus
the fraction of rights traded. Note that since this fraction is publicly observable at the end of the
rights offer period, it is unlikely that a low-k company would try to fool the market into believing
that its k-value is high.15
Hypothesis 1 predicts that high-k issuers will use neither standby rights nor private placement.
Consistent with this prediction, Panel (a) of Table 4 shows that current shareholder takeup is
on average higher for uninsured rights offerings than for standby offerings. The mean takeup for
uninsured rights is 94.4% while the mean takeup for standby rights is 84.8%. The corresponding
numbers using median to measure differences are 96.4% and 91.5%. In terms of our flotation model,
this suggests that the threshold value for k that separates standbys and uninsured rights (k4sr) is
somewhere in the range of 0.85 to 0.91.
Panel (b) and (c) show takeup in two subsamples created by splitting the public offering sample
according to whether or not the issue had a takeup above or below the median takeup. As predicted
by our model, a disproportionately large number of uninsured rights offerings are in the subsample
with above median takeup, and a disproportionately large number of standby rights offerings are
in the subsample with below median takeup.16 Importantly, as the model predicts, there are no
cases where a rights offer is attempted when the value of k is low.
15This observation drives our earlier assumption that k becomes known to the market at the time of the issue
announcement.
16The subsamples also reveal a non-linearity in the takeup data. Panel (b) of Table 4 show that issues with below
median takeup exhibit the same tendency as the overall sample—uninsured rights have a higher takeup than standby
rights. However, panel (c) show that the takeup in the above-median subsample are similar for both offer types.
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3.3 Market reaction to equity offerings
We estimate abnormal stock returns using the conditional event parameter δ in the following market
model:
rit = αi + βirmt +
2∑
j=1
δijdjt + it, (13)
where rit is the continuously compounded daily equity return to firm i over period t; rmt the daily
return on a value weighted market portfolio of all OSE-listed stocks; d1t is a ”runup” dummy
variable taking on a value of one during the event window from day −130 through day −4, and
zero otherwise; d2t is an ”announcement” dummy variable taking on a value of one during (1) the
two-day event window from day −1 through day 0, or (2) the four-day event window from day
−3 through day 0, respectively, and zero otherwise;17 and δ is the daily abnormal return to firm
i averaged over the corresponding event window. Thus, the total abnormal return to firm i over
the event window of ω days is ω × δij . The estimation period starts on trading day −310 relative
to the announcement date and ends on trading day +160. Issues with less than four months (82
trading dates) of data prior to the announcement are excluded from the analysis.18
The sample average values for δ, representing the average abnormal stock price run-up and
announcement-induced abnormal returns, are reported in Table 5 along with the p-values for the
hypothesis of zero abnormal returns.19 The two-day announcement period abnormal return for
standby rights offerings is not significantly different from zero, while uninsured rights offerings show
a positive abnormal return of about 1.0% (statistically significant at the 10% level). When using the
four-day event window, the average market reaction to standby rights offerings remains insignificant,
while the market reaction to uninsured rights offerings doubles to a statistically significant 2.1%.
Turning to private placements, the average announcement-period abnormal return for the total
17Event studies of U.S. public equity offerings typically use a two-day event window to measure the announcement
effect. Event studies of U.S. private placements (e.g., Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993)) use a four-day
announcement window. For comparison purposes, we report both.
18This reduces the standby- and rights offering samples with 5 and 4 observations, respectively. The private
placement sample is reduced by 17 observations (14 observations if mergers are excluded). The resulting estimation
periods is 471 trading dates (the maximum) for about 88% of the issues, and the shortest estimation period is 244
trading dates.
19Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return, the following test statistic converge in distribution to the
standard normal distribution
zj =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
δˆij
σˆij
,
where δˆij is the OLS estimate of δij , and σˆij is the estimated standard error of this estimate.
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sample is similar in magnitude to uninsured rights. However, excluding the private placements
associated with mergers reduces the magnitude and renders the two-day abnormal return statisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero. With the four-day window, the effect of excluding merger-related
private placement is minimal, other than reducing power (p-vale falls from 0.22 to 0.50). With
the four-day window, the market reaction to private placements is a significantly positive 2.66%.
This finding is comparable to the four-day average abnormal return of 4.4.% reported by Wruck
(1989) for 128 private placements in the US, and with the slightly lower market reaction reported
by Hertzel and Smith (1993) also on US data. Moreover, Kang and Stulz (1996) find a cumulated
abnormal return of 2.13% in a sample of 69 private equity offerings in Japan, while Wu and Wang
(2003) document an average market reaction of 3.5% to 99 private placements over the three-day
window (-1, 1).
The announcement-induced abnormal return for private placements incorporates the effect of
any discount or premium in the offer. For example, Hertzel and Smith (1993) reports an average
discount in the private placement issue price (relative to the pre-issue market price). In uninsured
rights, there are no costly discount. Thus, to better gauge the relative magnitudes of rights and
private placements, we next adjust the announcement returns reported in Table 5 for any issue
discount.
We follow Bradley and Wakeman (1983) and measure the net return to old shareholders (the
information effect) using the following adjusted abnormal return:
AAR =
(
1
1− δ
)
AR−
(
δ
1− δ
)(
POffer − Pa−4
Pa−4
)
, (14)
where δ is the fraction of the company owned by the new private investors after the private place-
ments, POffer is the offer price, Pa−4 is the market price four days prior to the announcement day,
and AR is the four-day abnormal stock return. To illustrate, suppose the private investor will own
20% of the shares after the issue (δ = .2), and the average four-day announcement period abnormal
return is 2.6% (AR= 0.026). In order for “issue costs” to explain the positive announcement day
effect, the issue must be placed at a premium of 13%.
Table 6 report AAR using the 133 sample observations with available data on the placement
price. Note that the adjustment alters the distributional properties of the the original abnormal
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return estimate AR in a way that we cannot determine. Thus, we ignore issues of statistical
significance, so this exercise is primarily to illustrate relative magnitudes. As shown in the first
row of Table 6, the private equity placement implies an ownership stake for the new investor
that averages 24%. The average holding is acquired at a premium of 3.5% when mergers and
acquisitions are included, and of 0.9% when mergers and acquisitions are excluded. Both numbers
are statistically insignificant at conventional levels using a standard t-test. Thus, the first row does
not change the basic conclusion from Table 5 that the market reaction to private placements and
uninsured rights offers are statistically indistinguishable.
As a robustness check, Table 6 reports results of trimming the sample by excluding extreme
observations. The ”weak” trimming excludes observations with a discount less than 60% or a
premium higher than 60%, the medium and strong trimming use 40% and 20% as cutoff percentages
respectively. The trimmed samples also exhibit a positive premium, although smaller and still not
statistically different from zero. Even though the average premium is positive, the average adjusted
abnormal returns (AAR) are positive and larger than the average unadjusted abnormal returns
(AR). This can only happen if the private placements with a positive premium typically give new
investors a smaller fraction of the post issue company (i.e., δ is low) than placements that are done
at a discount. Computing an average premium by weighting each observation with δ confirms this.
Under the weak sample trimming, the weighted average premium is −2.7% (i.e., a discount). The
full sample show large AARs, but looking at the trimmed samples, these seem to be driven by
outliers in the data. Nevertheless, the trimmed samples show AARs that are more than twice the
size of the unadjusted abnormal returns. Thus, we conclude that the information effect from the
announcement of private placements is reliably positive.
Overall, the announcement-period abnormal returns for rights, standbys and private placements
reported in tables 5 and 6 are largely consistent with the predictions stated in Hypothesis 1. First,
the highest-k issuers use uninsured rights. The average market reaction to uninsured rights is
significantly positive, as predicted if the pre-issue price (p−) contains an underinvestment discount.
Second, firms using standbys have intermediate or low values of k. The average market reaction
to standbys is statistically insignificant, possibly because the values of k are in the lower range of
[k4pp, k4sr]. Third, the average market reaction to private placements is positive and statistically
significant. With no adjustment for the offering premium, this market reaction is indistinguishable
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from the market reaction to uninsured rights, otherwise it appears to be larger than for uninsured
rights.
Interestingly, It appears that the strong market reaction to private placements is in part driven
by a offer premium. That is, in contrast to much of the extant literature, we find that the offer price
in private placements at the OSE are on average greater than the market price four days prior to
the offer announcement. Note that this finding reinforces our assumption that a private placement
involves lower direct costs than a standby rights offer (which are offered with a discount).
It is also possible that the positive announcement-period return for private placements reflects
expectations of increased monitoring. Panel (a) in Table 7 splits the sample in two groups based on
whether shareholder concentration increased or decreased over the year of the private placement.
A standard t-test fails to reveal a statistically different announcement-effect across the two groups.
Panel (b) reports the coefficients from a regression of abnormal returns on shareholder concentration
and percent insider holding. The two-day announcement period returns is unrelated to shareholder
concentration (δ1) and positively related to the insider holdings at the beginning of the offering
year (coefficient δ2). These results provide little support for the monitoring hypothesis.
4 Long-run issuer performance
The evidence above allow joint tests of the equilibrium flotation method strategy and the rationality
of the market. In their study of US private placements, Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002)
challenge the rationality assumption and argue instead that the market tends to overreact. They
support their claim by providing long-run post-issue performance estimates that are significantly
negative. Given the paucity of empirical research of the efficiency of the Oslo Stock Exchange, it is
useful to perform a long-run performance analysis also for our equity issuers. We use two alternative
procedures for estimating long-run abnormal performance. The first is the matched control firm
approach used by Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002). Here, expected returns to issuers are
measured as the realized stock return to non-issuing firms matched on size and book-to-market
ratio. In the second procedure, we estimate a multi-factor asset pricing model used to generate
expected returns.
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4.1 Performance using matched control firms as benchmark
The performance measure used in this section is similar to the one used by Loughran and Ritter
(1995). For firm that announces an issue in month t, the procedure is as follows:
(1) All firms on OSE are ranked based on market capitalization (size) in month t. Then all
companies with an equity capitalization in the interval [(vi/1.3), 1.3vi] are identified, where
vi is the market value of the issuer’s common stock at the end of month t. The company
within this size-interval with the closest book-to-market ratio to the issuer is then selected as
the matched firm.20
(2) The holding period returns for the issuer and the matched firm are computed from the month
following the offer announcement day and the earlier of the three-year anniversary date and
the delisting date for the issuer. If the matched firm delists a new matched firm is selected
as described above but using the delisting date instead of the announcement date. If the
matched firm issues equity, it is treated as if it was delisted.
The first rows of panel (a) in Table 8 reports three-year holding-period return for our sample of
Norwegian public and private equity offerings when the matched firm is selected based on size only.
Both for public offerings and private placements, the issuing firms have lower three-year holding
period returns than their corresponding matched firms. The average abnormal performance for
public offerings is a statistically insignificant −7.1%, while private placements show a negative
performance of about 25 percent (statistically significant at around the 8% level). However, results
change when using size/book-to-market as matching criteria. The first two rows of panel (b)
of Table 8 show that both offer types still have negative long-run abnormal returns, but with
size/book-to-market matching the underperformance of public offerings are more severe than the
underperformance of private placements.
The average three-year holding period return for public offerings is 42.6%, while matched firms
have an average holding period return of 65.2%. The −22.6% abnormal return is significant at the
10% level using bootstrapped p-values and at the 5% level using a standard t-test. The private
placement sample show negative three-year abnormal performance (−10.4%), but this is not statis-
tically different from zero. Thus, Table 8 shows some evidence of long-run abnormal performance
20Below, we also report performance when selecting the matched firm based on size only.
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for Norwegian public equity offerings, especially when using size/book-to-market matched firms
as the benchmark. Given the difference in results using size and size/book-to-market matching,
the rest of the discussion of Table 8 will mainly be based on the results using size/book-to-market
matching. There are two reasons for this. First, since we know that both size and book-to-market
ratio is related to the cross-section of asset returns, size/book-to-market matching should give a
better match than size matching only. Second, the findings of Jegadeesh (2000) indicate as long
as one control for differences in book-to-market ratio, adding other matching criteria only affect
long-run abnormal performance marginally.
In the model of section 2, the incentive to time an issue is decreasing in the current shareholder
takeup k. Thus, under the overconfidence hypothesis, the long-run performance should be negative
and greater for rights offerings with below-median takeup than for offerings with above-median
takeup. The results in last two rows of Table 8 do not support this prediction. The three-year
holding period return for issuers with below median current shareholder takeup is 38.8%, while
the corresponding return for matched firms is 56.1%. The −17.3% abnormal long-run return is
not statistically significant at conventional levels. Issuers with above median takeup experience
an even worse long-run performance (−27.9%), statistically significant at the 10% level using both
bootstrapped and t-statistic based p-values. However, a standard t-test fails to reject the hypothesis
of no difference in the abnormal long-run returns of the two median-splitted subsamples. The
overconfidence hypothesis also predicts that announcement-induced abnormal return and long-run
abnormal return should be correlated. While not shown, when we regress long-run abnormal
returns on a constant and the announcement period abnormal returns, we find that this prediction
is rejected for all of the offering categories.
4.2 Performance using a factor-model as benchmark
Factor model procedures assume that expected returns are generated by a set of K pre-specified
risk factors. The average monthly abnormal return of portfolio p is estimated as the constant term
(”Jensen’s alpha”) in a regressing of the portfolio return on the risk factors. The expected value
of alpha equals zero for passively held portfolios provided the specified factor model adequately
captures the pervasive risk factors underlying the economy. We follow Ferson and Schadt (1996) and
Eckbo and Smith (1998) and condition our factor model estimation on a vector Zt−1 of observable
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characteristics that may be useful in forecasting time-variations in expected returns:
rpt = αp + b′p0rmt + b
′
p1(Zt−1 ⊗ rmt) + ept. (15)
Here, rpt and rmt are portfolio return and returns on factor mimicking portfolios in excess of the
return on the risk free asset, the K-vector bp0 measures average factor loadings, the KL-vector
bp1 is designed to pick up predictable time-variation in factor loadings. The motivation for the
conditional model framework is the growing evidence that expected returns are predictable using
publicly available information.21 In the presence of time-varying expected returns, an estimate
of Jensen’s alpha derived from an unconditional model is a biased measure of the true abnormal
performance, and our conditional factor model estimation represents an attempt to correct for this
bias.
The dependent variables in the factor model regressions are the monthly returns to equal- and
value-weighted portfolios of security issuers. To illustrate, the value-weighted private placement
portfolio is constructed as follows: Invest one dollar in the stocks of the first firm that announces
a private placement. At the beginning of the first month after the second private placement
announcement, the portfolio is rebalanced to include the new company using current value-weights.
This process is continued as additional firms issue securities, until the first firm reaches its three-
year anniversary or a firm in the portfolio is delisted, at which point it is removed and the portfolio
is again rebalanced using value-weights.
We create ten such ”issuer portfolios” by partitioning the sample according to offering type
(standby rights/uninsured rights/private placements), by shareholder takeup (above and below
median), and by using equal and value weights. Similarly, ten “match-portfolios” is constructed
using the corresponding set of size/book-to-market matched firms identified in the preceding anal-
ysis. Finally, six “zero-investment portfolios” are constructed by selling issuer-portfolios short to
finance a long position in the match-portfolio, and two “zero-investment portfolios” are constructed
by going short in below median takeup issuers and long in above median takeup issuers.
The four risk factors used in the conditional expectation models are described in panel (a) of
21Ferson and Harvey (1991) and Evans (1994) argue that time-variation in conditional betas for passive portfolios
is economically and statistically small in the U.S. However, Ferson and Schadt (1996) find that time-varying betas
are important in their measurement of the performance of managed U.S. mutual funds. Moreover, it is commonly
accepted that conditional expected risk premiums tend to vary with economy-wide factors such as the business cycle.
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Table 9. The excess return on the market portfolio (RM) is computed as the difference between
the return on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) total index and the return on 1-month NIBOR. The
term structure factor (∆Term) is computed as the change in long-maturity government bonds (from
OECD) and 3-month NIBOR. The exchange-rate factor (∆USD/NOK) is computed as the change
in the NOK/USD exchange rate. The oil-price factor (∆Brent) is the change in the Brent Blend
(crude oil) spot price. The three factors that are not return on portfolios (∆Term, ∆USD/NOK,
and ∆Brent) should ideally have been represented by factor mimicking portfolios. However, it
turned out to be hard to accomplish this in a meaningful way. The factor mimicking procedures
of Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989) and Lehmann and Modest (1988) using either decile
portfolios or the 30 largest companies each year to mimic the factor time-series, generated factor
returns that had very low correlation with the original macro economic variables. Thus, the factor
model uses the macro economic variables ∆Term, ∆USD/NOK, and ∆Brent directly as factors.22
The information variables (Zt−1) are the return on the Morgan Stanley World Index in excess
of the return on the 1-month NIBOR (MSWI excess return), the dividend yield on the Morgan
Stanley World Index (Dividend Yield), a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in January
and zero otherwise (January Dummy), and real per capita growth rate of industrial production
(Industrial Production Growth). Except for the January dummy, the numbers in panel (a) and (b)
are percentages.
Table 10 reports the results for portfolios of standby rights offerings, uninsured rights offerings,
and private placements. The rows labeled “EW issuer” or “VW issuer” contain results for equally-
and value weighted issuer portfolios respectively. The rows labeled “EW M−I” contain the results
for zero-investment portfolios that sell issuer portfolios short in order to finance a long position in
the matched firm portfolios. The last column of Table 10 report the p-values for an F -test of the
null hypothesis that none of the elements in bp1 are statistically different from zero. In other words,
a test of the time-varying beta model. Except for the equally weighted standby rights portfolio,
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level for any of the portfolios. That is, we cannot
22When factors are not returns on portfolios, they enter the asset return generating process as deviations from
their conditional expected value (See Shanken (1992)). In order to test the sensitivity of our results to the model
misspecification that arises because ∆Term,∆USD/NOK, and ∆Brent are not measured as the deviation from their
respective expectations, the regressions are also run with ∆Term,∆USD/NOK, and ∆Brent measured as the deviation
from the time-series mean. The results using this specification are virtually identical.
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reject the hypothesis that betas are constant over time. The betas reported in the columns marked
RM, ∆Term, ∆USD/NOK, and ∆Brent in Table 10 and 11 are computed as bˆp0 + bˆp1Z, where Z
contain the time series means of the information variables, bˆp0 is the estimate of bp0, and bˆp1 is the
estimate of bp1.23 The p-values for the betas are from an F -test of the null that the scalar bj0p and
the L-vector bj1p (j = 1, . . .K) are both zero.
Column two of Table 10 reports Jensen’s alpha for the portfolios. The alphas measures the
average monthly abnormal return in percent. Thus, the 0.7% average monthly abnormal return for
value weighted standby rights issuers represent a three-year abnormal return of about 29%. The
portfolios of rights issuers have positive alphas, indicating that these are overperforming relative
to the benchmark. However, except for the value-weighted standby rights issuer portfolio, the
alphas are not different from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. The evidence
of no abnormal performance for rights issuers are reinforced by the results for the zero-investment
portfolios. The zero-investment portfolios have positive but statistically insignificant alphas.24
Turning to the private placements portfolios, Table 10 shows some evidence of underperfor-
mance. The equally-weighted issuer portfolio and the equally-weighted zero-investment portfo-
lios both show evidence of statistically significant underperformance for private placements. The
equally-weighted private placement portfolio underperform the factor model benchmark by 0.91%
on average over the sample period. This is comparable to a three-year abnormal holding period
return of about −39%. The 1.0% average monthly abnormal return for the equally-weighted zero
investment portfolio show that most of this abnormal performance is generated by the short po-
sition in the issuing firms. The performance of the private placements change dramatically when
the portfolio returns are computed using value-weights. The issuer portfolio now show a positive
alpha (an insignificant 0.33%) and the abnormal performance of the zero-investment portfolio is
dramatically reduced.
Panel (a) and (b) of Table 11 report the performance of portfolios constructed based on the
current shareholder takeup. Firms with below median takeup is placed in one portfolio while firms
23The mean of the January dummy have no economic meaning. Replacing the mean with zero or one have virtually
no effect on the results.
24These results are consistent with evidence on long-run performance of SEOs by firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) reported by Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000). Using
a multi-factor model with macroeconomic factors, Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) find no evidence of abnormal
long-run performance for SEOs over the period 1963–1998.
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with above median takeup is placed in another portfolio. Using either equal or value-weights,
both below-median and above-median portfolios show positive abnormal performance (significant
at the 5% level for the value weighted portfolios.) In order to test whether or not the below-
median portfolio have performance significantly different from the performance of the above-median
portfolio, a zero-investment portfolio is constructed by selling the above-median portfolio short and
use the proceeds to finance a long position in the below-median portfolio. As shown in panel (c)
of Table 11, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the equally and value-weighted zero-investment
portfolios have normal returns.
In sum, we fail to reject the hypothesis of zero abnormal post-issue performance for any of
the three offer-type portfolios or for the takeup-grouped portfolios. This result, which is robust
with respect to the estimation technique, fails to support the overconfidence hypothesis, and places
confidence in our announcement-induced abnormal returns as unbiased estimates of the economic
effect of the equity issue announcements.
5 Conclusions
Myers and Majluf (1984) provide insights into the equity issue decision that receive substantial
empirical support in studies of seasoned equity offerings in the US. However, their model does not
anticipate the positive market reaction to seasoned equity issue announcements often reported in
international studies, nor is it designed to explain firms’ choices among alternative equity-selling
mechanisms. Preserving key aspects of the original Myers-Majluf framework, we formalize the
equity-flotation choice using a multistage flotation game. We show that there exists a pooling
equilibrium in which the issue announcement conveys positive news to the market. We then estimate
the market reaction to seasoned equity offerings on the Oslo Stock Exchange using the full set of
flotation methods observed in that market. The market reaction is non-negative across flotation
methods, and significantly positive for uninsured rights and private placements.
In our flotation game, the menu of flotation methods contains uninsured rights, rights with
standby underwriting, and fully guaranteed offering which we refer to as a private placement.
The order in which these flotation methods are tried out is determined endogenously. The pooling
equilibrium implies a flotation method preference ordering (akin to a pecking order) that depends on
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expected shareholder takeup (k): High-k firms use uninsured rights (with minimal wealth transfer).
Medium- and low-k firms start the issue process with quality inspection. Medium-k issuers prefer
the standby method but move on to private placement if the underwriter rejects the issue, and
vice versa for low-k issuers. As the issue game progresses, the menu of flotation methods narrows
until the firm either accepts uninsured rights (having been rejected by both the underwriter and
the private placement investor) or abandons the issue.
In the empirical part of the paper, we present an event study of the market reaction to seasoned
equity offerings on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The sample is useful because it includes all flotation
methods observed in this equity market, providing a meaningful comparison of the average market
reaction across uninsured rights, standby rights and private placements. Several interesting results
emerge. First, the observed shareholder takeup levels preserve the theoretical rank ordering, with
only the highest-k issuers selecting uninsured rights. This is consistent with the levels of shareholder
takeup for US rights issues reported by Eckbo and Masulis (1992) as well.
Second, the market reaction is non-negative across all offering categories, a finding that is
unique to the empirical literature. Third, the market reaction is significantly positive for private
placements. This is consistent with our pooling equilibrium where low-k issuers prefer private
placement and survive inspection. Elsewhere in the literature, private placements are typically also
associated with a positive market reaction, e.g., Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) on
US data, and Wu and Wang (2003) in Hong Kong. Interestingly, we also find that the offer price
in private placements on the OSE typically are at a premium relative to the stock price shortly
before the issue announcement, which contrasts with the evidence of a discount typically reported
by studies of other markets, and in particular in the US (Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2003)).
Fourth, we also document a significantly positive market reaction to uninsured rights offers. In
the pooling equilibrium, this market reaction is predicted to be zero: high-k issuers all prefer this
method and since there is no issue inspection, there is also no information conveyed to the market. A
positive market reaction is, however, consistent with the joint hypothesis of our pooling equilibrium
and prior market expectations of adverse selection in issue markets. Adverse selection reduces the
market value of all firms relative to the first-best investment policy. Since the announcement of an
uninsured rights issue by high-k firm causes the market to impound in the issuer’s stock price the
present value of the investment project also in the high-value state, the issuer’s stock price will be
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revised upwards. Our finding of positive market reaction to uninsured rights is typical for studies of
smaller equity markets, e.g. Loderer and Zimmermann (1987) (Switzerland), Kang (1990) (Korea),
Tan, Chng, and Tong (2002) (Singapore), and Cronquist and Nilsson (2003) (Sweden).
Finally, we address two alternative hypotheses that propose a different interpretation to some of
our empirical findings. First, if private placements result in greater shareholder concentration and
monitoring, then the positive announcement-period abnormal return reflects a reduction in agency
costs and not necessarily the information content depicted by our issue game. However, we find no
evidence that the announcement effect is greater for the subsample of private placements with the
greater increase in shareholder concentration over the year of the issue. Second, the positive market
reaction may reflect overconfidence on the part of investors, and thus represent biased estimates of
the true information content in the issue announcement. This hypothesis implies some degree of
price reversal in the period following the equity issue. We construct an empirical factor-model for
the OSE and examine average returns to a portfolio strategy involving shorting the stock of issuing
firms and investing in non-issuers matched on firm size and book-to-market ratio. We fail to reject
the hypothesis of zero post-issue abnormal performance to equity issuers on the OSE.
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A Proofs of propositions
A.1 Proof of proposition 2
The equilibrium flotation method path is {pp, sr, ur}. In this equilibrium, when the issuer ap-
proaches the market to do an uninsured rights offering, the market knows that the issuer has been
rejected twice by inspections. Moreover, the underwriter knows the issuer has been rejected once,
and the private investor knows that the issuer will try a private placement first. Thus, the beliefs
are:
µ(pp, sr, ur) =
(1− q)2(1− p)
q2p+ (1− q)2(1− p)
ψ(pp) =
q(1− p)
(1− q)p+ q(1− p)
ψ(pp, sr) = 1− p
(16)
Define ψ′ ≡ ψ(pp), ψ ≡ ψ(pp, sr) and µ ≡ µ(pp, sr, ur). Total issue costs for the flotation methods
in {pp, sr, ur} are:
C ′pp = dpp +
αa2(1− δk)(1− β)(1− ψ′)
β + (1− β)ψ′ + (1 + η − ρpp)α
Csr = dsr +
αa2(1− k)(1− β)(1− ψ)
β + (1− β)ψ + (1 + η − ρsr)α
Cur = dur +
αa2(1− k)(1− β)(1− µ)
β + (1− β)µ+ (1 + η − ρur)α
(17)
The corresponding incentive constraints for the first stage of the game are:
qC ′pp + (1− q) [qCsr + (1− q)Cur] ≤ qCsr + (1− q)
[
qC ′pp + (1− q)Cur
]
qC ′pp + (1− q) [qCsr + (1− q)Cur] ≤ qC ′pp + (1− q)Cur
qC ′pp + (1− q) [qCsr + (1− q)Cur] ≤ qCsr + (1− q)Cur
qC ′pp + (1− q) [qCsr + (1− q)Cur] ≤ Cur
(18)
Using the assumption that inspection is informative, these conditions reduce down to:
Cpp ≤ Csr ≤ Cur (19)
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If the private investor concludes the inspection with “low value”, the issuer attempts a standby
rights offer. The incentive constraint at this stage of the game simplifies to Csr ≤ Cur. At the final
stage of the game, only the participation constraint (b ≥ Cur) remains. Thus, the path {pp, sr, ur}
is an equilibrium if:
C ′pp ≤ Csr ≤ Cur ≤ b. (20)
The corresponding restrictions on shareholder takeup is derived by solving the inequalities Cpp ≤
Csr, Csr ≤ Cur, and b ≥ Cur for k:
k2pp =
dpp − dsr
αa2(1− β) +
1− ψ
vsr
− 1− ψ
′
v′pp
1− ψ
vsr
− 1− ψ
′
v′pp
δ
k2sr = 1− dsr − dur
αa2(1− β)
[
1− µ
vur
− 1− ψ
vsr
]
k2b = 1− (b− dur)vur
αa2(1− β)(1− µ)
(21)
where
v′pp = β + (1− β)ψ′ + (1 + η − ρpp)α
vsr = β + (1− β)ψ + (1 + η − ρsr)α
vur = β + (1− β)µ+ (1 + η − ρpp)α
(22)
A.2 Proof of proposition 3
Beliefs In this proposition, the equilibrium flotation method path is {sr, pp, ur}. In equilibrium,
the market knows that the issuer has been rejected twice when approached with an uninsured
rights offering; the private investor knows that the issue failed at the standby rights stage; and the
underwriter knows the issuer will try standby rights first. The following beliefs are consistent with
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the equilibrium strategy:
µ(pp, sr, ur) =
(1− q)2(1− p)
q2p+ (1− q)2(1− p)
ψ(sr) =
q(1− p)
(1− q)p+ q(1− p)
ψ(sr, pp) = 1− p
(23)
Define ψ′ ≡ ψ(sr), ψ ≡ ψ(sr, pp) and µ ≡ µ(pp, sr, ur). Total issue costs for the flotation methods
in {sr, pp, ur} are:
Cpp = dpp +
αa2(1− β)(1− ψ)
β + (1− β)ψ + (1 + η − ρpp)α
C ′sr = dsr +
αa2(1− k)(1− β)(1− ψ′)
β + (1− β)ψ′ + (1 + η − ρsr)α
Cur = dur +
αa2(1− k)(1− β)(1− µ)
β + (1− β)µ+ (1 + η − ρur)α.
(24)
By an argument analogous to the proof of proposition 2, the binding participation constraint is
b ≥ Cur, and the incentive constrains simplify to C ′sr ≤ Cpp ≤ Cur. The restrictions on shareholder
takeup is derived by solving the inequalities C ′sr ≤ Cpp, Cpp ≤ Cur, and b ≥ Cur for k:
k3pp =
dpp − dsr
αa2(1− β) +
1− ψ
vpp
− 1− ψ
′
v′sr
1− ψ
vpp
δ − 1− ψ
′
v′sr
k3sr =
dur − dpp
αa2(1− β) +
1− µ
vur
− 1− ψ
vpp
1− µ
vur
− 1− ψ
vpp
δ
k3b = 1− (b− dur)vur
αa2(1− β)(1− µ)
(25)
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where
vpp = β + (1− β)ψ + (1 + η − ρpp)α
v′sr = β + (1− β)ψ′ + (1 + η − ρsr)α
vur = β + (1− β)µ+ (1 + η − ρpp)α
(26)
A.3 Proof of proposition 4
The expected costs for the three equilibria {ur}, {pp, sr, ur}, and {sr, pp, ur} are, respectively
{ur} : C ′ur
{pp, sr, ur} : qC ′pp + (1− q) [qCsr + (1− q)Cur]
{sr, pp, ur} : qC ′sr + (1− q) [qCpp + (1− q)Cur]
(27)
Define:
U =
αa2(1− β)(1− µ)
β + (1− β)µ+ (1 + η − ρur)α
U ′ =
αa2(1− β)p
β + (1− β)(1− p) + (1 + η − ρur)α
P =
αa2(1− β)(1− ψ)
β + (1− β)ψ + (1 + η − ρpp)α
P ′ =
αa2(1− β)(1− ψ′)
β + (1− β)ψ′ + (1 + η − ρpp)α
S =
αa2(1− β)(1− ψ)
β + (1− β)ψ + (1 + η − ρsr)α
S′ =
αa2(1− β)(1− ψ′)
β + (1− β)ψ′ + (1 + η − ρsr)α
(28)
The takeup threshold level k4pp is derived by comparing expected costs in {pp, sr, ur} and
{sr, pp, ur}:
qC ′pp + (1− q) [qCsr + (1− q)Cur] ≤ qC ′sr + (1− q) [qCpp + (1− q)Cur] (29)
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Using the above definitions and solving for k, we get:
k ≤ q(dsr − dpp) + S
′ − P ′ − (1− q)(S − P )
S′ − δP ′ − (1− q)(S − δP ) ≡ k4pp (30)
The takeup threshold level k4sr is derived by comparing expected costs in {ur} and {sr, pp, ur}:
C ′ur ≤ qC ′sr + (1− q) [qCpp + (1− q)Cur] (31)
Using the above definitions and solving for k, we get:
k ≥ [1− (1− q)
2]dur − qdsr − (1− q)qdpp − qS′ − (1− q)qP − (1− q)2U + U ′
U ′ − qS′ − (1− q)qδP − (1− q)2Y ≡ k4sr. (32)
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Figure 1
The game between equity issuers and investors
The game proceed to a new subgame if the bargaining between issuer and investor fails. If the bargaining succeed or
either the not issue or the uninsured rights offering is chosen, the game ends.
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Figure 2
Sequential equilibria and shareholder takeup.
A. Inspection technology is such that q = 0.8, direct
costs as a percentage of issue proceeds is assumed to
be ρur = 0.02, ρpp = 0.03, and ρsr = 0.044, and share-
holder takeup in a private placement is assumed to be
30% of the takeup that would have materialized in a
rights offering (γ = 0.3).
C. Inspection technology is such that q = 0.8, direct
costs as a percentage of issue proceeds is assumed to
be ρur = 0.03, ρpp = 0.02, and ρsr = 0.044, and share-
holder takeup in a private placement is assumed to be
100% of the takeup that would have materialized in a
rights offering (γ = 1.0).
B. Inspection technology is such that q = 0.8, direct
costs as a percentage of issue proceeds is assumed to
be ρur = 0.03, ρpp = 0.02, and ρsr = 0.044, and share-
holder takeup in a private placement is assumed to be
30% of the takeup that would have materialized in a
rights offering (γ = 0.3).
D. Inspection technology is such that q = 0.5, direct
costs as a percentage of issue proceeds is assumed to
be ρur = 0.02, ρpp = 0.03, and ρsr = 0.044, and share-
holder takeup in a private placement is assumed to be
30% of the takeup that would have materialized in a
rights offering (γ = 0.3).
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Figure 3
Pareto dominating equilibria.
Inspection technology is such that q = 0.8, direct costs as a percentage of issue proceeds is assumed
to be ρur = 0.02, ρpp = 0.03, and ρsr = 0.044, and shareholder takeup in a private placement is
assumed to be 30% of the takeup that would have materialized in a rights offering (γ = 0.3). The
other parameters are as in Table 1.
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Table 1
Numerical illustration of the equilibrium in Proposition 2
The inspection performed by the private investor and the underwriter is informative and symmetric. The direct costs
are highest for standby rights and lowest for private placements. The probability private investors and underwriters
put on facing each type is consistent with Bayes’ rule using the prior distribution, the inspection ability, and the
equilibrium strategy.
A. Exogenous parameters
Types Prior Inspection Direct costs Investment Project NPV
a1 = 59 p(a1) = 0.5 q(a1 | a1) = 0.80 dpp = 0.60 30 11
a2 = 109 p(a2) = 0.5 dur = 0.90
dsr = 1.32
k = 0.4
γ = 0.3
B. Equilibrium beliefs
Inspection concludes
Type a1 Type a2
Subgame Type Before inspection Before offer After offer Before offer After offer
Private placement a1 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.2
Private placement a2 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.8
Standby rights a1 0.8 0.941 1.0 0.5 0.5
Standby rights a2 0.2 0.059 0.0 0.5 0.5
Uninsured rights a1 0.941
Uninsured rights a2 0.059
C. Costs and reservation prices
Inspection concludes
Type a1 Type a2
Subgame Type
Expected
costs
if rejected
Investor’s
expected
value
Issue
costs
Investor’s
expected
value
Issue
costs
Private placement a1 −0.40 99.10 0.90 139.40 −6.69
Private placement a2 5.74 99.10 14.21 139.40 2.79
Standby rights a1 0.08 98.68 1.32 123.68 −2.31
Standby rights a2 8.88 98.68 10.44 123.68 4.96
Subgame Type
Expected
costs
if rejected
Investor’s
expected
value
Issue
costs
Uninsured rights a1 11 102.34 0.08
Uninsured rights a2 11 102.34 8.88
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Table 2
Number of seasoned equity offerings by OSE-listed firms in the sample, 1980–1996
Public equity offeringsa Private placementsb
Year
Number of
offerings in
percent of
number of
firms
Number
of firms
Total
number of
offerings Total
Standby
rights
Uninsured
rights
Including
mergers
Excluding
mergersc
1980 3.2 124 4 4 0 4 – –
1981 11.2 116 13 13 4 9 – –
1982 16.9 118 20 20 2 18 – –
1983 24.4 119 29 29 9 20 – –
1984 18.9 148 28 24 14 10 4 2
1985 19.0 163 31 24 13 11 7 3
1986 14.2 155 22 14 10 4 8 7
1987 8.9 146 13 8 7 1 5 4
1988 16.4 134 22 10 10 0 12 12
1989 30.2 129 39 21 19 2 18 14
1990 24.0 121 29 9 9 0 20 12
1991 17.0 112 19 6 6 0 13 11
1992 11.4 123 14 9 9 0 5 4
1993 23.7 131 31 14 13 1 17 16
1994 16.4 134 22 11 11 0 11 9
1995 12.3 163 20 4 4 0 16 16
1996 14.5 173 25 8 8 0 17 16
Sum 16.5 2309 381 228 148 80 153 126
aThe sample includes the 200 rights offerings compiled by Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen (1997)
bThe sample excludes placements that are part of an employee stock ownership plan.
cThis subsample excludes private placements followed by a merger or takeover involving the issuer within one year
of the placement.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for seasoned equity offerings by OSE-listed firms in the sample,
1980–1996
Public equity offerings
Total Total Standby rights Uninsured rights Private placements
(a) Issue and issuer characteristics
Number of issuesa The 381 228 148 80 153
Amount offered (NOK millions) 136 146 190 65 120
Market value of equity (NOK millions) 749 667 856 316 870
Book-to-market ratio 1.01 1.15 1.22 1.04 0.79
(b) Ownership characteristicsb
Percent holding by the ten largest owners
at the beginning of the issue year – – 57.42 (81) 56.77 (19) 64.96 (77)
Percent holding by the ten largest owners
at the end of the issue year – – 57.95 (98) 47.89 (28) 65.81 (66)
Percent holding by insidersc
at the beginning of the issue year
– – 8.31 (115) 6.35 (66) 18.13 (88)
Percent holding by insiders
at the end of the issue year
– – 6.16 (117) 4.99 (74) 15.44 (74)
aThe 228 public issues involving rights are made by a total of 116 different OSE-listed firms, for an average of 2.0
over the sample period. The 153 private placements are made by a total of 91 different firms, with an average of 1.7
placements per form over the period. Of the different firms, 60 issues only once over the sample period.
bOwnership information is from the companies annual reports. Numbers in parentheses are number of observations
cInsiders include the CEO and members of the board of directors
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Table 4
Current shareholder takeup in seasoned equity offerings by OSE-listed firms in the
sample, 1980–1996
Takeup is defined as the fraction of the issue acquired by the old shareholders. Assuming that each warrants issued
in a rights offering only is traded once, takeup is proxied by one minus the fraction of warrants sold in the secondary
market.
N Mean STD 90% 75% 50% 25% 10%
(a) All issues
Uninsured rights 80 94.38 7.03 98.89 97.99 96.43 93.44 89.63
Standby rights 148 84.81 17.14 99.27 96.34 91.47 79.68 61.17
Total 228 88.17 15.11 99.08 97.34 93.93 84.77 69.40
(b) Issues with below median takeup
Uninsured rights 24 87.68 9.91 93.60 93.19 91.78 87.74 74.64
Standby rights 90 76.76 17.76 92.48 89.68 81.52 70.82 52.65
Total 114 79.06 16.98 93.43 91.51 84.77 73.11 55.27
(c) Issues with above median takeup
Uninsured rights 56 97.24 1.41 99.08 98.24 97.32 96.28 95.19
Standby rights 58 97.31 2.05 1.00 99.27 97.40 95.33 94.51
Total 114 97.28 1.76 1.00 98.00 97.34 95.80 94.98
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Table 5
Average pre-announcement date run-up and announcement-day abnormal returns to
OSE-listed firms making public and private equity offerings, 1980–1996
Six month run-up and announcement day abnormal returns for issuer i are computed using the following market
model:
rit = αi + βirmt +
2∑
j=1
δijdjt + it,
where rit is daily return on firm i, rmt is daily return on a value weighted market portfolio of all OSE-listed firms.
The estimation period is a total of 471 trading dates, starting on trading day -310 relative to the announcement
date and ending on trading day +160 relative to the announcement date. The dummy variable d1t takes on a value
of one on trading days -130 through -4. The dummy variable d2t takes on a value of one in either a two-day or a
four-day window ending at the announcement day. The percentage abnormal return for a ω-day event window is
ω× δij × 100. Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return, the following test statistic converge in distribution
to the standard normal
zj =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
δˆij
σˆij
.
Where δˆij is the OLS estimate of δij , and σˆij is the standard error of this estimate. Returns are continuously
compounded. The parentheses contain number of observations and p-values. The p-values are for two-sided tests.
Public equity offerings Private placements
Standby rights Uninsured rights Including mergers Excluding mergers
Six-months
runup
4.60
(143; .004)
9.15
(76; .028)
18.52
(136; .000)
20.32
(112 : .000)
Two-day announce-
ment return
−0.58
(143; .234)
0.95
(76; .088)
1.39
(136; .058)
1.00
(112 : .318)
Four-day announce-
ment return
−0.55
(143; .502)
2.11
(76; .000)
2.66
(136; .022)
2.66
(112; .050)
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Table 6
Average adjusted four-day announcement-day abnormal returns to OSE-listed firms
making private equity offerings,1984–1996
The return to old shareholders due to the information effect can be measured using an adjusted abnormal return:
AAR =
(
1
1− δ
)
AR−
(
δ
1− δ
)(
POffer − Pa−4
Pa−4
)
,
where δ is the fraction of the company owned by the new private investors after the private placements, POffer is the
offer price, Pa−4 is the market price four days prior to the announcement day, and AR is the four-day abnormal stock
return. The sample trimming excludes extreme observations: weak trimming exclude observations with a discount less
than 60% or a premium higher than 60%, the medium and strong trimming use 40% and 20% as cutoff percentages
respectively.
Including mergers Excluding mergers
Sample trimming N Prem δ AR AAR N Prem δ AR AAR
None 133 3.56 23.96 2.67 37.19 109 0.92 23.65 2.67 42.34
Weak [−60%,+60%] 115 0.41 20.79 1.81 5.85 94 0.81 20.13 1.49 5.58
Medium [−40%,+40%] 109 1.39 20.30 1.38 4.85 90 1.95 19.96 1.46 4.91
Strong [−20%,+20%] 87 0.70 17.99 1.07 2.29 72 1.06 16.60 1.37 1.79
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Table 7
Ownership structure and abnormal announcement period returns for OSE-listed
firms making private equity offerings,1984–1996
The regression variables CONC and INSIDE are shareholder concentration and insider holdings respectively. Share-
holder concentration is measured as the percentage total shareholdings of the ten largest stockholders. Insider holdings
include the shareholdings of the CEO and the board of directors. The regression in panel (b) uses the concentration
and insider holdings from the beginning of the offering year.
(a) Change in shareholder concentration and average abnormal announcement period return
Including mergers Excluding mergers
Decreased
shareholder
concentration
Increased
shareholder
concentration
Test of
difference
(p-value)
Decreased
shareholder
concentration
Increased
shareholder
concentration
Test of
difference
(p-value)
Two-day announce-
ment return
3.02 1.16 .403 3.34 1.62 .491
Four-day announce-
ment return
4.23 2.75 .654 5.01 3.63 .696
(b) Regression: AR = δ0 + δ1CONC+ δ2INSIDE
Dependent
variable δ0 δ1 δ2 δ0 δ1 δ2
Two-day announce-
ment return
0.03
(.918)
−0.05
(.333)
0.097
(0.041)
0.04
(.260)
−0.06
(.287)
0.09
(.082)
Four-day announce-
ment return
−0.01
(.831)
0.05
(.520)
0.04
(.532)
−0.00
(.999)
0.04
(.607)
0.05
(.537)
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Table 8
Three-year buy-and-hold returns (%) to OSE-listed firms making public and private
equity offerings, and their matched control sample, 1980–1993
The matches are chosen using size- and size/book-to-market matching. The size-matching is done using the equity
market value of the issuer in the month prior to the issue announcement. Size/book-to-market matching is done by
first selecting all companies that have an equity market value within 30% of that of the issuer. Then the company
with the closest book-to-market value is chosen as the matched firm. Monthly book-to-market rankings in year t
are created by dividing the end-of-year book-value from year t − 1 with monthly market capitalizations for year t.
Numbers in the columns marked “issuer” and “match” are computed using:
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
Ti∏
t=τi
(1 +Rit)− 1
]
× 100
The p-values in the column marked p(t) are p-values of the t-statistic using a two-sided test of no difference in
average five-year buy-and-hold return for issuer and matched firms. The p-values in the column marked p(N) are
bootstrapped p−values of a two-sided test.
Issue type N Issuer Match Difference p(N) p(t)
(a) Size matching
All public offerings 227 44.5 51.6 -7.1 0.640 0.458
All private placements 150 20.4 45.3 -24.9 0.078 0.080
Standby rights 147 31.8 45.5 -13.7 0.360 0.261
Uninsured rights 80 67.9 62.7 5.1 0.795 0.731
Below Median takeup 114 39.7 49.8 -10.1 0.548 0.461
Above Median takeup 113 49.3 53.4 -4.1 0.902 0.762
(b) Size- and book-to-market matching
All public offerings 221 42.6 65.2 -22.6 0.080 0.033
All private placements 147 20.0 30.4 -10.4 0.302 0.390
Standby rights 143 30.9 53.1 -22.2 0.072 0.087
Uninsured rights 78 64.1 87.4 -23.3 0.296 0.193
Below Median takeup 111 38.8 56.1 -17.3 0.285 0.222
Above Median takeup 110 46.5 74.4 -27.9 0.089 0.077
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Table 9
Summary statistics on risk factors and information variables used in the conditional
factor models of expected returns
The excess return on the market portfolio (RM) is computed as the difference between the return on the Oslo Stock
Exchange (OSE) total index and the return on 1-month NIBOR. The term structure factor (∆Term) is computed
as the change in long-maturity government bonds (from OECD) and 3-month NIBOR. The exchange-rate factor
(∆USD/NOK) is computed as the change in the NOK/USD exchange rate. The oil-price factor (∆Brent) is the
change in the Brent Blend (crude oil) spot price. The information variables are: The return on the Morgan Stanley
World Index in excess of the return on the 1-month NIBOR (MSWI excess return), the dividend yield on the Morgan
Stanley World Index (Dividend Yield), a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in January and zero otherwise
(January Dummy), and real per capita growth rate of industrial production (Industrial Production Growth). Except
for the January dummy, the numbers in panel (a) and (b) are percentages.
Mean Min Max Std.
(a) Risk factors in the conditional factor model
RM 0.50 -26.59 20.20 6.29
∆Term 0.00 -0.29 0.36 0.06
∆NOK/USD 0.23 -6.14 7.56 2.40
∆Brent 0.37 -28.51 53.86 9.76
(b) Information variables Zt−1
MSWI excess return 0.31 -18.13 10.40 4.09
Dividend Yield 3.26 0.39 6.05 1.21
January dummy 8.06 0.00 1.00 27.28
Industrial Production Growth -0.17 - 3.14 2.31 0.69
(c) Correlation matrix for risks in the conditional factor model
RM ∆Term ∆NOK/USD ∆Brent
RM 1.00
∆Term 0.12 1.00
∆NOK/USD 0.07 0.02 1.00
∆Brent 0.14 -0.03 0.04 1.00
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Table 10
Jensen’s alpha for private and public equity issuer using a conditional multi-factor
asset pricing model as an expected return benchmark
The four risk variables in rm are the excess return on the market portfolio (RM) is computed as the difference between
the return on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) total index and the return on 1-month NIBOR. The term structure
factor (∆Term) is computed as the change in long-maturity government bonds (from OECD) and 3-month NIBOR.
The exchange-rate factor (∆USD/NOK) is computed as the change in the NOK/USD exchange rate. The oil-price
factor (∆Brent) is the change in the Brent Blend (crude oil) spot price. The information variables Zt−1 are listed in
table 9. The model
rpt = αp + b
′
p0rmt + b
′
p1(Zt−1 ⊗ rmt) + ept
is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed using the heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of White
(1980). The column labeled Adj.-R2 contains adjusted R2 for the regression. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Betas at mean Zt−1
Portfolioa αˆp RM ∆Term ∆USD/NOK ∆Brent Adj.-R
2 F (Z)
(a) Standby rights
EW issuer 0.20 (0.551) 1.03 (0.000) 34.86 (0.000) 0.16 (0.080) −0.05 (0.702) 0.684 0.003
VW issuer 0.70 (0.030) 1.15 (0.000) 7.55 (0.490) 0.21 (0.062) −0.09 (0.151) 0.753 0.231
EW M−I 0.65 (0.154) −0.19 (0.195) −15.33 (0.104) 0.14 (0.948) −0.04 (0.590) 0.035 0.756
VW M−I 0.34 (0.416) −0.18 (0.050) −5.08 (0.502) −0.04 (0.480) 0.05 (0.205) 0.061 0.239
(b) Uninsured rights
EW issuer 0.21 (0.730) 0.62 (0.000) −2.95 (0.994) −0.04 (0.631) −0.08 (0.320) 0.198 0.563
VW issuer 0.59 (0.327) 0.72 (0.000) −2.39 (0.942) −0.08 (0.934) −0.03 (0.647) 0.237 0.653
EW M−I 1.06 (0.130) 0.00 (0.005) 11.99 (0.773) 0.03 (0.791) 0.02 (0.688) 0.040 0.062
VW M−I 0.86 (0.261) −0.06 (0.022) 8.84 (0.961) −0.08 (0.710) 0.01 (0.423) 0.022 0.135
(c) Private placements
EW issuer −0.91 (0.038) 0.94 (0.000) 21.50 (0.031) −0.08 (0.406) 0.02 (0.768) 0.567 0.361
VW issuer 0.33 (0.371) 1.16 (0.000) 5.37 (0.302) 0.01 (0.313) −0.02 (0.385) 0.692 0.290
EW M−I 1.00 (0.051) −0.10 (0.704) −4.75 (0.584) 0.12 (0.294) −0.08 (0.588) -0.027 0.794
VW M−I 0.16 (0.782) −0.16 (0.581) −10.86 (0.057) −0.13 (0.090) −0.04 (0.472) 0.039 0.230
aPortfolios are either equal-weighted (’EW’) or value-weighted (’VW’). The ’M−I’ portfolios are zero-investment
portfolios with a long position in the matched firms and a short position in the issuing firms.
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Table 11
Jensen’s alpha for portfolios of issuers with below and above median takeup using a
conditional multi-factor asset pricing model as an expected return benchmark
The four risk variables in rm are the excess return on the market portfolio (RM) is computed as the difference between
the return on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) total index and the return on 1-month NIBOR. The term structure
factor (∆Term) is computed as the change in long-maturity government bonds (from OECD) and 3-month NIBOR.
The exchange-rate factor (∆USD/NOK) is computed as the change in the NOK/USD exchange rate. The oil-price
factor (∆Brent) is the change in the Brent Blend (crude oil) spot price. The information variables Zt−1 are listed in
table 9. The model
rpt = αp + b
′
p0rmt + b
′
p1(Zt−1 ⊗ rmt) + ept
is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed using the heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of White
(1980). The column labeled Adj.-R2 contains adjusted R2 for the regression. The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Betas at mean Zt−1
Portfolioa αˆp RM ∆Term ∆USD/NOK ∆Brent Adj.-R
2 F (Z)
(a) Below median takeup
EW issuer 0.53 (0.188) 0.88 (0.000) 25.28 (0.000) −0.03 (0.929) −0.04 (0.640) 0.522 0.087
VW issuer 0.81 (0.032) 1.01 (0.000) 3.83 (0.505) 0.12 (0.647) −0.07 (0.516) 0.629 0.006
(b) Above median takeup
EW issuer 0.23 (0.545) 0.71 (0.000) 33.40 (0.000) 0.20 (0.007) −0.06 (0.595) 0.443 0.018
VW issuer 0.90 (0.014) 0.82 (0.000) 10.13 (0.544) −0.01 (0.489) −0.08 (0.166) 0.498 0.663
(c) Zero investment portfolios (Above−Below)
EW A−B −0.29 (0.577) −0.18 (0.107) 7.64 (0.536) 0.23 (0.032) −0.02 (0.955) 0.022 0.280
VW A−B 0.06 (0.909) −0.18 (0.005) 5.36 (0.898) −0.12 (0.626) −0.02 (0.900) 0.032 0.255
aPortfolios are either equal-weighted (’EW’) or value-weighted (’VW’). The ’A−B’ portfolios are zero-investment
portfolios with a long position in the above median takeup portfolio and a short position in the below median takeup
portfolio.
53
